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Stock Redemptions From Close Family
Corporations Under Section 302
Since the enactment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,
persons wishing to redeem stock in close family corpora-
tions have found that the attribution rules create a new
obstacle to attaining capital gains treatment for the pro-
ceeds from their redemptions. Because the limits on the
applicability of the attribution rules to section 302 in
general and its dividend equivalence test in particular have
not thus far been adequately defined, many redemptions
from close corporations are executed without definite un-
derstanding of their tax consequences. The author of this
Note explores the present problem and suggests an ap-
proach that would aid redeeming stockholders in antici-
pating the tax consequences of their redemptions.
INTRODUCTION
The stock redemption provisions of the 1954 Code are of spe-
cial significance to owners of stock in closely held family corpora-
tions, for when such stockholders wish to sell their stock, often
the only available or the only interested purchaser with liquid
purchasing power is the corporation itself.' A sale of such stock to
the issuing corporation constitutes a redemption,2 which may be
denied capital gains treatment and be taxed as a dividend.3 This
1. The charter or by-laws of most close family corporations place restric-
tions upon the transfer of their stock. These restrictions often give the
corporation (1) a pre-emptive right to purchase the stock of a shareholder
should he decide to sell, (2) an option to purchase upon the happening of
a particular event, or (3) an option to "call" at the discretion of the cor-
poration or its board of directors. In addition, these buy-out arrangements
often provide for the transfer of a deceased shareholders stock to the cor-
poration at a fixed or ascertainable price. 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS § 7.05 (1958). Similar restrictions may also be imposed by agree-
ments among the shareholders or between the corporation and its sharehold-
ers. See 12 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5453 (perm. ed. rev. repel.
1957).
2. A redemption is the retirement of stock or bonds by the issuer
through a repurchase. Stock is "treated as redeemed by a corporation if
the' corporation acquires the stock from a shareholder in exchange for
property, whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, or held as
treasury stock." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 317(b).
3. When a redemption of stock is taxed as a dividend, the basis of the re-
deemed stock is often lost to the taxpayer. For example, if a taxpayer re-
deems all his stock in X corporation, with a cost basis to him of S 100,000,
and it is taxed as a: dividend, his initial cost of $100,000 would not only be
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possibility is particularly onerous to the executor of an estate who
may be forced to sell its stockholdings in a close family corporation
to retain stock ownership in the surviving shareholders or to pay
off estate debts.4
The purpose of this Note is to consider some of the problems
involved in securing capital gains treatment for redemptions by
close family corporations. It will place special emphasis upon the
determination of when such redemptions are not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend, for this will frequently be the only means to
secure capital gains treatment for these redemptions.
I. NONDIVIDEND TREATMENT OF REDEMPTIONS
UNDER SECTION 302(b)(2) AND (3)
A redemption of stock will be treated as a sale and taxed at the
capital gains rate if it qualifies under one of the provisions of
section 302(b). 5 A redemption will qualify under this section if
lost, but he would be taxed on the proceeds of the redemption at ordi-
nary income tax rates. See generally Brodsky & Pincus, The Case of
the Reappearing Basis, 34 TAXEs 675 (1956); Katcher, The Case of the
Forgotten Basis: An Admonition to Victims of Internal Revenue Code Sec-
tion 115(g), 48 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1950). The Advisory Committee on
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code has suggested a change in § 302
to alleviate the possible harsh effects of lost basis. See Hearings Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means on Advisory Group Recommenda-
tions on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 485-86 (1959).
4. Ordinarily when an estate sells stock, there will be very slight tax
consequences since the basis of the stock will have been adjusted to its
fair market value at the date of the decedent's death, thus limiting the
capital gains tax on the sale to any appreciation that occurs between the
date of the basis adjustment and the date of the sale. INT. REV. CODE Or
1954, § 1014(a).
5.
(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.-
(1) REDEMPTIONS NOT EQUIVALENT TO DIVIDENDS.-Subsection (a)
shall apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE REDEMPTION OF STOCK.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution
is substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(B) LIMITATION.-This paragraph shall not apply unless immedi-
ately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote.
(C) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this paragraph, the distribu-
tion is substantially disproportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all
of the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to
all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
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it is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, if it is substantially
disproportionate to the shareholder's prior interest, or if it is a
complete termination of the shareholder's interest.' The applica-
tion of section 302(b) to determine whether a redemption will
be treated as a sale, however, requires more than an application
of these tests to stock held by the shareholders; section 302(c) (1)
specifically provides that in determining stock ownership for pur-
poses of section 302, the constructive ownership rules of section
318 (a)' shall apply.
Under section 318, a taxpayer's stockholdings are deemed to in-
clude stock constructively owned by him.' Under the family at-
tribution rules of this section, a person is deemed to constructively
own stock owned by a member of his family. Similarly, under
the entity attribution rules, stock owned by a partnership, a trust,
or an estate is constructively owned by the partners or benefici-
aries, and stock owned by the partners or beneficiaries is con-
structively owned by the partnership, trust, or estate.10 This pro-
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as
substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of
the common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvot-
ig) after and before redemption also meets the 80 percent require-
ment of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sen-
tence, if there is more than one class of common stock, the deter-
minations shall be made by reference to fair market value.
(3) TERMINATION OF SHAREHOLDER'S INTEREST.-Subsection (a)
shall apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all of the
stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
(5) APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPHS.-In determining whether a re-
demption meets the requirements of paragraph (1), the fact that such
redemption fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (2), (3), or (4)
shall not be taken into account. If a redemption meets the requirements
of paragraph (3) and also the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (4),
then so much of subsection (c) (2) as would (but for this sentence)
apply in respect of the acquisition of an interest in the corporation
within the 10-year period beginning on the date of the distribution
shall not apply.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b).
6. The sale treatment accorded the redemption of stock issued by rail-
road corporations in certain reorganizations under § 302(b)(4) is beyond
the scope of this Note.
7. See generally Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Owner-
ship in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REv. 209 (1958). Section
318(a) is similar in effect to the other constructive ownership sections of
the Code. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 267(b), 544(a).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a)(4)(A).
9. Family members for purposes of § 318(a) include an individual's
spouse, children, grandchildren, and parents. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 318(a)(1).
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a)(2). For an example of attributing
19631
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vision makes it very difficult for redemptions by close family cor-
porations to qualify as sales under the objective tests of section
302(b) that require a redemption to be either substantially dis-
proportionate or a complete termination of the shareholder's
interest. A discussion of some hypothetical redemptions will illus-
trate this point.
A. SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE REDEMPTIONS
A redemption is "substantially disproportionate" within the
meaning of section 302(b) (2) if, immediately after the redemp-
tion, the redeeming shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the
total combined voting stock of the corporation and his own voting
power has been reduced by more than 20 percent as a result of
the redemption. Consider, for example, the situation where H
owns 60 of the 100 issued and outstanding shares of X corporation
and P owns the remaining 40 shares. If H dies, leaving W, his
wife, as the sole beneficiary of his estate, any redemption of 24
or more shares would be substantially disproportionate; the es-
tate would own 36 of the then outstanding 76 shares, or 47.4 per-
cent, and its percentage of voting control would have been re-
duced by more than 20 percent.1 Any resulting gain would there-
fore be taxed as a capital gain.13
If the facts of the example are changed to make X corporation
a close family corporation, with P being the son of H and W, the
constructive ownership rules of section 318 would apply, and the
redemption would fail to qualify as substantially disproportionate.
Under the family attribution rules, P's stock would be attributed
to W upon the death of H, making her the constructive owner of
his 40 shares; the 40 shares of stock owned constructively by W,
the beneficiary of the estate, would then be attributed to the es-
tate by the entity attribution rules, making it the constructive own-
er of all 100 shares of X corporation's stock. 4 Since immediately
stock owned by the beneficiaries of an estate to the estate, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.318-3(a), example (1) (1960).
11. Only stock that is issued and outstanding in the hands of shareholders
is relevant for purposes of applying § 302(b)(2). See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3
(a)(3) (1955).
12. The estate formerly had 60% [60- 100] of the voting control; it now
has 47.4% [36 "76]. Therefore, its percentage of voting control has been re-
duced by 21% [100-(47.4- 60)].
13. Twenty-four is the minimum number of shares that must be redeem-
ed to qualify the redemption in this hypothetical for capital gains treatment
under § 302(b)(2). The redemption of any number of shares from 25 to 60
would also satisfy the requirements of § 302(b)(2).
14. This hypothetical involves a two-step attribution from the son to the
mother and from her to the estate. If this were a two-step attribution among
NOTES
after any redemption, the estate would still be the constructive own-
er of 100 percent of the outstanding voting stock, no redemption
from this hypothetical estate could ever be substantially dispro-
portionate.
B. COMPLETE TERMINATION OF SHAREHOLDER'S INTEREST
Section 302(b) (3) provides that in the case of a complete re-
demption of all the stock of a single shareholder, the proceeds will
be taxed as capital gains. In addition, the savings clause of sec-
tion 302(c) provides that in determining whether a termination
of the shareholder's interest has taken place, the family attribution
rules of section 318(a)(1) may sometimes be waived."0 This
savings clause will be invoked if, immediately after the distribu-
tion, the shareholder does not have any interest in the corporation 17
other than that of a creditor; if he does not acquire any interest in
the corporation within ten years of the date of the redemption;
and if there is no person who owns stock that would be attributable
to the redeeming shareholder under section 318(a) who acquired
it from the redeeming shareholder ten years before the redemption,
unless this stock is redeemed simultaneously.' The Internal Rev-
enue Service has ruled that this waiver applies only to situations
where the distributee constructively owns stock by virtue of the
application of the family attribution rules of section 318(a) (1);
section 302(c) (2) was not intended to be used to waive the en-
tity attribution rules of section 318(a),(2).0 For any redemp-
family members only, it would be proscribed by § 318(a)(4)(B). See Treas.
Reg. § 1.318-4 (1955).
15. See generally Bernbach, Substantially Disproportionate Redemptions
Under the 1954 Act, 33 TAXEs 597 (1955); Ginsburg, How To Compute
Multiple Substantially Disproportionate Redemptions, 37 TAXES 387 (1959);
Laikin, Stock Redemptions: Sections 302 and 318, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON
FED. TAx 671, 677 (1956).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302 (c)(2).
17. The "interests" forbidden by this section include an interest as an
officer, director, or employee of the corporation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
18. In addition, he must agree to notify the Internal Revenue Service if
he acquires any interest in the corporation within 10 years after the re-
demption, and he must not during that period acquire any of the shares
that were redeemed from a person whose stock would be attributable to him
by § 318(a). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(2).
19. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 106. This ruling held that a
trust that -completely terminated its interest in a corporation could not avail
itself of the savings clause provision. All of the stock of the cormoratio,
involved was owned by H and the trust. The trust had been created by the
will of H's deceased wife for the benefit of their children. The stock of the
father was attributed to the children by § 318(a)(1)(A)Cii), and then from
the children to the trust by § 318(a)(2)(B). This resulted in the trust con-
structively owning 100% of the corporate stock. Although this ruling in-
1963]
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tion in which the family attribution rules are not used in the final
step of attribution of ownership to the distributee, therefore, the
savings clause cannot be used by the taxpayer. Therefore, if H
owns 60 of the 100 issued and outstanding shares of X corpora-
tion and S, his son, owns the remaining 40 shares, H could, by
complying with the savings clause, redeem all of his shares in X
corporation, and any resulting gain would be taxed at the capital
gains rate. Should H die before effecting the redemption, however,
this result would not necessarily follow. All of the stock would
then pass to his estate. If his wife, W, were the sole beneficiary of
the estate, the stock of the son would be attributed to his mother
by the family attribution rules, and then to the estate, the distribu-
tee, by the entity attribution rules. Because the family attribution
rules would not have been used in the final attribution to the dis-
tributee, the savings clause would not be available to allow the es-
tate to avoid attribution and completely terminate its interest in
the corporation.
The application of section 318 to certain redemptions of stock
held by estates may thus prevent them from qualifying for capital
gains treatment under the substantially disproportionate or the ter-
mination of interest tests of section 302(b). This does not, how-
ever, necessarily mean that those redemptions will be taxed as divi-
dends. A redemption that does not qualify under those tests may
still qualify as a sale under section 302(b) (1) if it is not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend.2°
II. THE DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE TEST OF
SECTION 302 (b) (1)
The dividend equivalence test of section 302(b) (1 ) is the only
part of section 302 to be carried forward from the 1939 Code.'
In fact, the language of the Senate Report on this section indicates
that Congress intended to re-enact essentially the same dividend
volved a redemption of stock held by a trust, the same holding would be
reached in the case of an estate because attribution to estates is also under
§ 318(a)(2), not § 318(a)(1).
The result reached in Revenue Ruling 59-233 has been vigorously at-
tacked. See Gleason & Jones, Recent Ruling Creates Double Attribution in
Redemptions; Perils Buy-Out Plans; Error Seen, 12 J. TAXATION 268
(1960).
20. The failure of a redemption to qualify under the substantially dispro-
portionate or the termination of interest tests in no way affects its ability
to qualify as not essentially equivalent to a dividend. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 302(b)(5); Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 195 (4th Cir.
1962).
21. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48.
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equivalence test that existed under the 1939 Code.2 Therefore,
to assess the dividend equivalence test of section 302(b)(1), a
consideration of both its development under the 1939 Code and its
application under the 1954 Code is necessary.
A. THE DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE TEST UNDER THE 1939 CODE
The present dividend equivalence test was first enacted in the
1926 Internal Revenue Act.' Section 201(g) of that act dis-
carded previous distinctions between ordinary redemptions and
redemptions involving stock dividends24 and made the dividend
equivalence test applicable to all redemption distributions; such dis-
tributions were treated as sales unless they were essentially equi-
valent to a dividend.
The 1939 Code adopted the dividend equivalence test in section
115(g). 25 This test, like its predecessors, provided no standards
22.
In general, under this subsection your committee intends to incorporate
into the bill existing law as to whether or not a reduction [sic] is es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend under section 115(g)(1) of the 1939
Code . . . .Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) provides that subsection(a) will apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend. The test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of para-
graph (1) is in general that currently employed under section 115(g)
(1) of the 1939 Code.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1954). But cf. note 43 infra.
23. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11. The dividend
equivalence test had its roots in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920),
where the Supreme Court held that since a stock dividend was not a dis-
tribution of company assets, it was not constitutionally taxable as income.
This decision made it possible for corporations to distribute nontaxable
stock dividends in lieu of cash dividends, then immediately redeem that
stock at capital gains rates. This tax loophole was closed by § 201(d) of
the Revenue Act of 1921, which made stock dividends taxable as ordinary
income if the stock issued as a dividend was cancelled or redeemed "at such
time and in such manner as to make the distribution... essentially equiva-
lent to the distribution of a taxable dividend . . . ." Ch. 136, § 201(d), 42
Stat. 228-29 (1921); see 61 CONG. REC. 7507 (1921) (remarks of Senator
McCumber). Section 201(t) of the 1924 Revenue Act changed the scope
and effect of the above provision by applying the dividend equivalence test
to redemptions preceding as well as following stock dividends. Ch. 234,
§ 201(f), 43 Stat. 255 (1924). Furthermore, § 201(g) of the 1924 Revenue
Act classified all distributions by a corporation in cancellation or redemp-
tion of part of its stock as partial liquidations. Ch. 234, § 201(g), 43 Stat.
255 (1924).
24. Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304, 306 n.2 (2d Cir. 1957).
25. See generally Gutkin & Beck, Stock Redemptions as Taxable Events
Under Section 115(g): The Impressionistic Test, 80 J. ACCOUNTANCY 285
(1945); Miller, Stock Redemptions, N.Y.U. 6TH INST. ON FED. TAX 307
(1948); Owen, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the 1954
Code, 32 TAXES 979 (1954); Note, Stock Redemption or Cancellation Tax-
able as Dividend-Section 115(g) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1344 (1936).
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to follow in applying the test to corporate redemptions.2" The
courts were thus forced to formulate their own standards, and as
a result, they created a judicial test known as the "net effect"
test.27 This test originally provided that "the net effect of the dis-
tribution [in redemption] rather than the motives and plans of the
taxpayer or his corporation, is the fundamental question in ad-
ministering section 115 (g)."2 s Among the relevant factors consid-
ered in applying the "net effect" test are (1) the past dividend his-
tory of the redeeming corporation;29 (2) the amount of past
earnings available for a dividend;"0 (3) the presence of a business
purpose;3 (4) whether the stockholder or the corporation initi-
ated the redemption;32 (5) whether the redemption terminated
26. See generally Note, Redemption and Partial Liquidations Under the
1954 Internal Revenue Code: The Dividend Equivalence Test, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 936 (1955).
27. Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
28. Id. at 939-40. Subsequent application of the test broadened it to
include inquiry into the possible existence of some legitimate business pur-
pose for the redemption. See, e.g., Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir.
1954).
29. A past history of dividend payments is considered evidence that the
redemption is not a substitute for a dividend. See, e.g., Fred B. Snite, 10
T.C. 523 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949), nonacq., 1948-2
CUM. BULL. 6 (withdrawn), acq., 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 5; J. NATWICK, 36
B.T.A. 866 (1937); Henry B. Babson, 27 B.T.A. 859 (1933), alf'd, 70 F.2d
304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 571 (1934), nonacq., XII-1 CUM.
BULL. 14 (1933). In T. Pierre Champion, 27 B.T.A. 1312 (1930), af/'d, 78
F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1935), the Board of Tax Appeals stated that a record of
substantial dividends "is not compatible with a studied intent to avoid
taxation."
30. Dividend treatment is imposed, in any case, only to the extent of
earnings and profits accumulated since February 28, 1913, or earned in the
year of distribution. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a). Therefore, the pres-
ence of a large earnings surplus for a number of years prior to a redemption
is a factor suggesting a dividend distribution. See, e.g., Rheinstrom v. Conner,
125 F.2d 790 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 654 (1942).
31. The factors considered in the "net effect" test have not been given
equal weight. The presence of a "business purpose" has been one of the fac-
tors weighed most heavily by courts in determining whether a redemption
is essentially equivalent to a dividend. In fact, the mere presence of a "busi-
ness purpose" actually overcame the other factors in Commissioner v. Sul-
livan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954). See Dean, The New Section 115(g)
Regulations, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX 587, 591 n.20 (1953).
Because the presence of a "business purpose" has been given such great
weight, it has sometimes been considered a separate test of dividend equiva-
lence in addition to the "net effect" test. Ballenger v. United States, 301
F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962). The prevailing view, however, is that the "busi-
ness purpose" inquiry is not a separate test. See Bradbury v. Commissioner,
298 F.2d 111 (lst Cir. 1962).
For an exhaustive list of transactions that are considered valid business
purposes for a redemption, see Treusch, Corporate Distributions and Adjuvt-
ments: Recent Case Reminders of Some Old Problems Under the New
Code, 32 TAXES 1023, 1037 (1954).
32. When the initiative for a redemption comes from the corporation, this
the shareholder's interest in the corporation;3 (6) whether there
was a scheme of tax avoidance;3 (7) whether the corporation
contracted or extinguished its business in any way;35 and (8)
whether the distribution in acquisition of stock caused a significant
change in the position of the recipient with respect to other share-
holders or to the corporation.36
The inquiry into the change in position of the shareholder caus-
ed by the redemption is the most important inquiry under the
net effect test 3 One of the characteristic features of a dividend
is that it is a distribution of corporate assets that does not disturb
the relative position of any stockholder with respect to the own-
ership and control of the corporation.38 The most obvious ex-
ample of a redemption that would have this result is a pro rata
redemption; by reducing the stockholdings of each shareholder
proportionately, it leaves the ownership and control of the corpo-
ration unchanged. 9 A redemption that is not completely pro rata
and reduces the stockholdings of only a few shareholders may,
however, still be essentially equivalent to a dividend if it does not
indicates both a business purpose and the absence of a tax avoidance mo-
tive. Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206 (1940), nonacq., 1940-1 CUM. BULL. 5.
33.
[A] cancellation or redemption by a corporation of all of the stock of
a particular shareholder, so that the shareholder ceases to be interested
in the affairs of the corporation, does not effect a distribution of a
taxable dividend.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115(g)-i(a)(2) (1953). See also Zenz v. Quinlivan.
213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954). The Internal Revenue Service interpreted
"ceases to be interested in the affairs of the corporation" to mean that the
taxpayer, in addition to redeeming all his stock, has
resigned as an officer and director of the corporation and has no in-
terest, direct or indirect, in the corporation . . . [and] there is no
relationship, other than business, between the individual concerned
and any other shareholder, and no member of his family is, or will be,
associated with the corporation.
Rev. Rul. 408, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 165, 166.
34. See Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
35. Under the dividend equivalence test of the 1939 Code, a corporate
contraction was an indication that a partial liquidation had taken place
and that capital gains treatment should be accorded the redemption. Mur-
phy, Dividend Equivalency-The End of the Beginning?, 10 TAX. L. REV.
213, 215 (1955).
36. See In re Estate of Lukens, 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957). Some
courts have stated that the question of lost basis is a consideration in de-
termining whether a redemption should be taxed as a dividend. See Fred
B. Snite, 10 T.C. 523 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949); William
I. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938). See generally note 3 supra.
37. See Commissioner v. Roberts, 203 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1953).
38. See Pullman, Inc., 8 T.C. 292, 297, acq., 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
39. See, e.g., Samuel I. Kessner, 26 T.C. 1046 (1956), alfd, 248 F.2d
943 (3d Cir. 1957); James F. Boyle, 14 T.C. 1382 (1950), affd, 187 F.2d
557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
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change the actual control of the corporation. Because this type of
redemption has the same effect upon corporate control as a pro
rata redemption, it is said to be "essentially pro rata."
B. THE DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE TEST UNDER THE 1954 CODE
Although "in general" Congress intended the dividend equiva-
lence test as developed under the 1939 Code to remain unchang-
ed in the 1954 Code,41 it did make two changes in the test. First,
the 1954 Code separates liquidating distributions from all other
types of corporate distributions.4 2 Thus, unlike section 115(g)
(1) of the 1939 Code, section 302(b)(1) does not apply to re-
demptions in complete or partial liquidation of a corporation; 3
40. A redemption will be considered pro rata even though it is not pre-
cisely pro rata as to all stockholders if it is, in terms of economic realities,
essentially pro rata. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111(1st Cir. 1962); Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 682
(9th Cir. 1957). Thus, a redemption from a shareholder that would reduce
his ownership in the corporation from 91.3% to 89.7%, although techni-
cally not pro rata, would be considered essentially pro rata since in all
practical respects the redemption would effectuate no basic change in the
ownership or control of the corporation. Bradbury v. Commissioner, supra.
To avoid the pro rata effect, the redemption must produce a significant
change in ownership and control of the corporation. Neff v. United States,
301 F.2d 330 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
41. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 346.
43. As a result of the separation in the tax treatment of corporate
liquidations from the treatment of all other types of corporate distributions
in the 1954 Code, the dividend equivalence test of § 302(b)(1) has been
narrowed; it now applies only to redemptions viewed from the standpoint
of the shareholders. The dividend equivalence test of § 346(a)(2) will af-
ford capital gains treatment to redemptions that are "not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend" from the corporation's standpoint. This change in the
scope of the dividend equivalence test was explained in S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
The effect of this change is to separate some of the factors of the dividend
equivalence test of the 1939 Code between the new "dividend equivalence"
tests of § 302(b)(1) and § 346(a)(2). Thus, such factors as whether the corpo-
ration continued to operate at a profit and whether the corporation con-
tracted or extinguished its business would generally not be considered in re-
demptions attempting to qualify under the provisions of § 302(b)(1), but
would instead be considered in assessing redemptions attempting to qualify
under § 346(a)(2). One authority has stated that this change in emphasis
is so important "that cases under the 1939 Code applying the 'net effect'
test cannot be relied upon to insure capital gains consequences on a re-
demption under the general language of Section 302(b)(1) of the 1954 Code.[It] appears clear that a new body of case law will be developed in
this area." Code Commentary, MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 302, at 33 (1955). See generally Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 194
(4th Cir. 1962).
Despite the fact that the 1954 Code has separated partial liquidations
from all other corporate distributions, the presence of a corporate con-
traction may still be a relevant factor in the dividend equivalence test in
section 346(a) (2) now governs all distributions in complete or
partial liquidations.
Second, and more important from the standpoint of a close
family corporation, the constructive ownership rules of section
318(a) are made applicable to redemptions under section 302."4
Under the 1939 Code, the courts had rejected the application of
any constructive ownership rules to the "net effect" test on the
ground that members of families, of trusts, and of estates were
separate taxable entities and should not be taxed as units.'
Since section 302(c) (1) provides that the attribution rules of sec-
tion 318(a) apply to section 302 generally, the Treasury"8 and
the leading cases47 have taken the position that section 318(a)
applies to the dividend equivalence test of section 302(b) (1)."'
The importance of this change from the standpoint of the redeem-
ing shareholder cannot be overemphasized, for attribution has the
effect of centralizing stock ownership. This makes more redemp-
tions essentially pro rata and, thus, increases the likelihood that a
given redemption will be found to be essentially equivalent to a
dividend.49
1. The Lewis Case
The most important case applying section 318(a) to the divi-
dend equivalence test pursuant to section 302(c) (1) was Thomas
certain instances-for example, if the redemption involving a corporate con-
traction fails to meet the strict tests for a partial liquidation under § 346(a)
and must qualify under § 302(b) to avoid dividend treatment.
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(1).
45. In re Estate of Lukens, 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957); Estate of Blauner,
30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1400 (1961); Ada M. McFarlane, 13 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 467 (1954); Marie W. F. Nugent-Head Trust, 17 T.C. 817 (1951),
acq., 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 3; Estate of Searle, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 957
(1950). Contra, William H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938). In the Searle
case, the Tax Court stated that "the ownership of stock in a corporation vests
in the individual who owns it, not the family to which he belongs." 9 CCH
Tax Ct. Mer. at 963.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-1(a),-2(b) (1962).
47. See Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq., 1961-2
CuM. BULL. 5; Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71 (1960).
48. The Tax Court had little trouble reconciling the applicability of the
attribution rules to the dividend equivalence test with the apparent con-
gressional intent to leave the test unchanged under the 1954 Code. The
court interpreted the language "in general" in the Senate Report to mean
that the dividend equivalence test of § 302(b)(1) was not to be "fully co-
extensive" with the old test of § 115(g)(1), but that it should have the
"new dimension" of § 318(a) added to it. Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71,
77 (1960).
49. The fact that a redemption is essentially pro rata is the single most
important factor in finding that a redemption is equivalent to a dividend.
See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
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G. Lewis.5" In that case, the decedent, who was the majority
stockholder and president of a family corporation, owed 20,500
dollars to the corporation for withdrawals made over a period of
years. At the time of his death, the decedent owned 156 shares of
the corporation's 283 outstanding shares; the decedent's daughters,
who were the beneficiaries of the estate, and their husbands owned
the remaining 137 shares. To pay the 20,500 dollar debt to the
corporation, the decedent's estate transferred to the corporation
51 shares of stock in full payment of the debt; the remaining 105
shares were distributed to the beneficiaries. The Tax Court ap-
plied the constructive ownership rules of section 318(a) strictly
by attributing the stock of the beneficiaries' husbands to the bene-
ficiaries under the family attribution rules and from the benefici-
aries to the estate under the entity attribution rules. As a result,
the court was forced to "appraise the facts of this case in light of
the assumption that the estate owned all of the stock."'" Thus,
any redemption from the estate would have been pro rata because
after the redemption the estate would still retain 100 percent con-
trol.
Although this case made it clear that the Tax Court believes
that the attribution rules are applicable to the dividend equivalence
test of section 302(b) (1),52 it did not determine how much weight
these rules should command in the "net effect" test. The Tax Court
seemed to give them great weight when it stated that this redemp-
tion might not have been treated as a dividend under the 1939
Code.5 This dictum suggests that if the attribution rules make a
redemption pro rata, it will be taxed as a dividend despite the fact
that all of the other factors in the "net effect" test suggest non-
dividend treatment. This interpretation would make the attribu-
tion rules the controlling factor in applying the dividend equiva-
lence test under the 1954 Code, and their strict application
would supersede the case law that developed under the 1939 Code.5'
The court's choice of the word "might" is significant, however,
because it is not entirely clear that the redemption in Lewis would
not have been treated as a dividend under section 115(g) (1 ) of
50. 35 T.C. 71 (1960).
51. Id. at 78.
52. Cases decided subsequent to Lewis have reaffirmed the position that
the attribution rules are applicable to the dividend equivalence test. See
Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962); Bradbury v. Com-
missioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962); Neff v. United States, 301 F.2d 330
(Ct. Cl. 1962); Archbold v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 329 (D.N.J. 1962);
Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq., 1961-2 CtuM. BULL.
5; Herbert C. Parker, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 893 (1961).
53. 35 T.C. at 75-77.
54. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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the 1939 Code. Although the redemption would not have been
considered pro rata because no attribution rules applied, the facts
of the Lewis case indicate that other significant factors were present
that, under the "net effect" test of section 115(g) (1), might have
resulted in the redemption being accorded dividend treatment. For
example, there was no business purpose for the redemption,
there were no dividends paid from 1935 to 1954 despite sufficient
accumulated earnings and profits, and there was no plan to con-
tract the corporate business. Therefore, despite the apparently con-
clusive weight given to the effect of the attribution rules in Lewis,
the Tax Court might regard the presence or absence of the other
factors in the "net effect" test as controlling. That is in fact what
the Tax Court did in the Squier case.5"
2. The Squier Case
In Estate of Arthur H. Squier,57 the stock in a close corporation
was controlled by three different interests at the death of the cor-
poration's president. The decedent's estate owned 50.09 percent,
the estate's beneficiaries owned 13.21 percent, and an unrelated
minority interest owned 36.70 percent. A major dispute develop-
ed between the executor and the beneficiaries of the estate over
the appointment of a new president. Due to the estate's control-
ling position in the corporation, the executor prevailed in this dis-
pute, but considerable friction and strained relations between the
executor and the beneficiaries resulted. Subsequently, the estate was
forced to redeem nearly one-third of its stock with the corporation
in order to pay the outstanding debts of the decedent, and as a
result, the estate lost its controlling position." The redemption
was attacked by the Commissioner on the ground that it was es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend. The Commissioner reasoned
that since the Lewis case required a strict application of the attri-
bution rules, the estate in Squier could be considered the owner of
63.30 percent of the stock before the redemption and 56.82 percent
after the redemption. He concluded that since the relation of the
taxpayer to the corporation was not changed in any aspect by the
redemption, the redemption was an essentially pro rata distribu-
tion and, thus, essentially equivalent to a dividend.59
55. See Pedrick, Stock Redemptions, the "Law" and the Profits, 49
ILL. BJ. 786, 792 (1961).
56. Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
57. 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
58. After the redemption, the estate's percentage share of ownership was
reduced to 41.27%; the beneficiaries' interest increased to 15.55%; and the
unrelated minority interest increased to 43.18%. Thus, the estate could no
longer exercise independent control over the corporation. Id. at 952.
59. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
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The Tax Court reaffirmed the rule of Lewis that the attribution
rules of section 318 should be strictly applied to redemptions tin-
der section 302 and recognized that the effect of this strict appli-
cation would seem to be to make the distribution essentially pro
rata.6" Under the facts present in the Squier case, however, the
court found that despite the application of the attribution rules,
the redemption was not essentially pro rata. An essentially pro rata
distribution produces no change in the ownership and control of
the corporation, and in fact, the control of the corporation in Squier
had changed hands.6' The family estrangement between the estate
and the beneficiaries caused by the dispute over the selection of a
new president meant that the redemption "in fact resulted in a criti-
cal reduction of the estate's control over the corporation.""2
60. After the redemption, the estate and its beneficiaries owned 56.82%
of the corporate stock. Thus, when the attribution rules were applied, the
redemption did not significantly change the ownership and control of the
corporation.
61. The Tax Court applied similar reasoning in its decision in Herbert
C. Parker, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 893 (1961), to reach a determination that
a redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. In Parker, the
taxpayer, who was in his seventies, owned 49.7% of the shares issued and
outstanding of H.C. Parker, Inc. The only other sizeable interest was the
47.4% owned by his son. The taxpayer and his son became involved in a
dispute over the management of the corporation; the son wanted to pursue
a plan of expansion, while his father favored the status quo. As a result of
the dispute, the taxpayer agreed to "sell" all of his stock to the corporation
in five installments, and in the first installment, he "sold" 60% of his stock
to the corporation. The Commissioner attacked the transaction on the
ground that it was a redemption that was essentially equivalent to a dividend.
He argued that the Lewis case called for the strict application of the at-
tribution rules, and that they would make the taxpayer the constructive
owner of 97.1% of the corporation's stock before the redemption and 96.7%
after the redemption. Under this reasoning, there was no significant change
in the ownership and control of the corporation, and therefore, the redemp-
tion was essentially pro rata and equivalent to a dividend. The Tax Court
rejected the Commissioner's plea for strict application of the attribution
rules and held that the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend. In distinguishing Parker from Lewis, the court said:
In Thomas G. Lewis .. .we applied the attribution rules of section
318. In that case, however, the findings are devoid of any reference
to controversy or adversity of interest among the various shareholder
interests . ...
!,rIfter taking the entire record into account, including the rela-
tionships involved and the history of sharp and continuing disagreement
between Parker and Parker Jr., we conclude on the unusual facts pre-
sented that the redemption brought about a significant change of control
and we hold that the redemption here at issue was not essentially
equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1) . ...
Id. at 900-01. (Emphasis added.) As in Squier, therefore, the court refused
to consider the effect of applying the attribution rules when it found that
the redemption caused a significant change in actual control, which was
evidenced by the disagreement between the related stockholders.
62. 35 T.C. at 955-56.
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Furthermore, the redemption increased the unrelated minority in-
terest in the corporation from 36.70 to 43.18 percent. 3 Finally,
the fact that the corporation had a record of past annual divi-
dends mitigated against this redemption being essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend.'
3. The Attribution Rules and the Dividend Equivalence Test
In avoiding the harsh consequences of dividend treatment that
would have resulted from a strict application of the attribution
rules, the Tax Court in Squier seems to have used family estrange-
ment as a justification for reaching a just result. The court failed
to consider the more significant question-whether there are cer-
tain redemptions under section 302(b) (1) to which the attribution
rules should not be applied at all. Professor Bittker has indicated
that in certain instances, the attribution rules should not be applied
to redemptions under section 302(b) (1).r1 He avoids the appar-
ently contrary intent of section 302(c) (1)6" by relying upon the
language of the Treasury Regulations under section 302(b)(1),
which state that a pro rata distribution wiU "generally" be es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend.6 7 This use of the word "gener-
ally" might indicate that some pro rata redemptions should be treat-
ed as sales under section 302(b) (1). Professor Bittker specifically
suggests that this argument might be successful where a redemption
is made pro rata because of the application of the attribution rules
to the dividend equivalence test." He suggests further that proof
of family estrangement should succeed in avoiding the application
of the attribution rules to a redemption of stock in a close family
corporation so that the redemption may nevertheless qualify as
not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b) (1).
Implicit in this suggestion is the idea that the attribution rules
should not be strictly applied to the dividend equivalence test.
Instead, they should be applied only if the facts of the particular
redemption reveal a realistic basis for equating constructive own-
ership with actual ownership and it appears from a factual inquiry
that the policy of the attribution rules would be furthered by their
application. The policy behind the attribution rules is to prevent
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 956.
65. Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations,
44 CORNELL L.Q. 299, 324 (1959).
66. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1963).
68. The position of the regulations is that the attribution rules are only
one of the factors to be considered in determining dividend equivalence.
Ibid.
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tax avoidance69 in cases where one member of a family unit is
able to control the stock owned by the other members or where a
trust or an estate can control the stock owned by its beneficiaries.7"
In effect, the attribution rules are merely statutory aids for deter-
mining whether a stockholder is merely a "dummy" stockholder7'
with no real voice in the control of the corporation.
The constructive ownership that results from applying the attri-
bution rules thus should not be considered actual ownership
for purposes of dividend equivalence unless a distribution to one
family member is actually a dividend to another family member
or unless the family member receiving the distribution has actual
control over the remaining shareholders by virtue of the family
relationship. For example, consider the situation where X cor-
poration has 100 shares outstanding-a decedent's estate holds 60
shares for W, the sole heir, and the remaining 40 shares are own-
ed by S, who is W's adult son. Under Lewis and Squier, unless
some family estrangement between W and S is shown, the attribu-
tion rules apply to make any redemption from the estate pro rata
and thus essentially equivalent to a dividend. Under the broader
approach suggested above, however, the application of the attribu-
tion rules is not automatic. This redemption could be made at
capital gains rates by W, the estate beneficiary, under section 302
(b) (3) and the savings clause of section 302(c) (2) immediately
after she receives the stock from the estate. Since the redemption
would not be equivalent to a dividend after a distribution to W, the
mere presence of the estate should not be considered an indication
of a tax avoidance motive calling for the strict application of the
attribution rules. Furthermore, under the facts in the hypothetical,
the distribution to W is not likely to be essentially equivalent to a
dividend to either W or S. Neither W nor the estate after redeem-
ing the entire 60 shares would have control of the corporation
through manipulation of S, W's adult son.7
69. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1954).
70. See ALI, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 67 (1958); Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and
Shareholders: American Law Institute Tax Project-American Bar Associa-
tion Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAX L. REV. 1, 50-51
(1958).
71. S!e In re Estate of Lukens, 246 F.2d 403 (1957); Plowden-
Wardlaw, Constructive Ownership Under the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1957).
72. It must also be considered that the estate will suffer the loss of
the stock's basis if it is taxed as a dividend. See note 3 supra. However,
under the facts of the hypothetical, the basis of the stock may not be en-
tirely lost, for to be consistent with the concept of economic unity embodied
in the constructive ownership rules, the court might shift the basis of the
estate's stock to W, and from her to S. Indeed, this result is suggested
Undoubtedly, in some situations this factual analysis will sup-
port the strict application of the attribution rules to prevent tax
avoidance. Consider, for example, X corporation, a close corpo-
ration with 100 shares outstanding. A decedents estate holds 60
shares for S, the decedent's son and sole heir. The remaining 40
shares are owned by W, S's wife, who received the shares as a
gift from S just prior to the death of the decedent. A redemption
of the 60 shares of the estate would not qualify as a termination of
the shareholder's interest because the shares of W would be at-
tributed to the estate through S, and the savings clause would not
prevent this entity attribution." The savings clause would also
be unavailable to save a complete termination of S's shares after
distribution of the estate because of S's disqualifying transfer to W
within the ten-year period immediately prior to the redemption.7"
Both of these redemptions should be held to be essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend through application of the attribution rules; in
both cases, cash will have been distributed by the corporation to
S, who will remain in control of the corporation by virtue of the
family relationship between him and W. It is justifiable to burden
S with the constructive ownership of W's shares because S's rela-
tionship to W gives him what is tantamount to actual ownership
of these shares. Under the rationale of Lewis and Squier, this sort
of factual analysis would never even be reached; the attribu-
tion rules would be strictly applied in the absence of proof of
actual family estrangement.
Other commentators have also argued that section 318(a)
should not be strictly applied to the dividend equivalence test.75
Their argument relies upon section 302(b)(5), which provides
that the fact that a redemption fails to qualify under one of the
objective tests of section 302(b) will not affect its outcome under
the dividend equivalence test. The strict application of the attribu-
tion rules would in many instances completely negate the purpose
and meaning of section 302(b) (5).7" That section suggests that
by the Treasury Regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c), examples 1-2
(1962). However, such shifting of basis would be fair only if W has a con-
tinuing interest in the shares of S and in the affairs of the corporation.
73. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
74. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(2)(B)(ii); see text accompanying
notes 17 and 18 supra.
75. See Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 739, 759 (1955); Donaldson & Hobbet, Plan-
ning for Redemptions Must Now Aivait Action in Mills Group Proposals,
10 J. TAXATION 222 (1959); Plowden-Wardlaw, supra note 71, at 461. See
generally Sutter, Corporate Distributions of Property, Stock and Stock
Rights-Dividend or Redemption?, 39 TAXES 982, 984 (1961).
76. An amendment to § 302(b) has been recommended to provide that
in determining whether a redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend,
8691963] NOTES
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:853
section 302(b)(1) was meant to protect certain redemptions
that fail to qualify as substantially disproportionate or as a termi-
nation of a shareholder's interest from being taxed unfairly. If
the attribution rules are applied strictly to section 302(b), such re-
demptions will also fail to qualify as not essentially equivalent to
a dividend.
CONCLUSION
While the two hypotheticals above illustrate almost opposite fac-
tual situations, each would receive the same tax treatment under
the rationale of Lewis and Squier. This illustrates the injustice cre-
ated by strictly applying the rigid attribution rules to the otherwise
subjective dividend equivalence test. Section 302(c)( 1 ) should be
interpreted to make the dividend equivalence test entirely subjec-
tive, and flexible enough to be applied equitably to all redemp-
tions. At the same time this approach would further the intention
that Congress reflected when it rejected, as too restrictive, a pro-
posal that section 302(b) be limited to such objective tests as
those now found in sections 302(b)(2) and 302(b)(3) for de-
termining nondividend treatment of redemptions.77 Congress intend-
ed to make the determination of whether a redemption would be
taxable "as a sale at capital gains rates or as a dividend at ordinary
income rates dependent, except where it is specifically provided
otherwise, upon a factual inquiry."7 " If the dividend equivalence
the constructive ownership rules of § 318 shall not be applicable. Under this
proposal, family relations would be considered along with the other facts
and circumstances of the case. The Advisory Committee apparently proposed
this change because of the judicial misinterpretation of § 302(b)(5), for in
concluding its recommendation, the committee stated:
It is believed that this amendment reflects the intent of the present stat-
ute, which now states that the fact that the redemption does not qualify
under (b)(2) or (b)(3) shall not be taken into account in making the
determination under (b)(l).
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Advisory
Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 483-84 (1959).
A strict interpretation of the language of §§ 318(a), 302(b)(1), and 302
(c)(1) could also lead to the conclusion that the attribution rules do not
apply to § 302(b)(1). Section 302(c)(1) makes the attribution rules of § 318
(a) applicable only "in determining the ownership of stock for purposes of
this section." Since § 302(b)(1) does not expressly refer to "ownership" of
stock, the attribution rules might be inapplicable to it. See Cohen, supra
note 75, at 758-59: Plowden-Wardlaw, supra note 71, at 460-61. Profes-
sor Bittker rejects this argument because "the rules of § 318(a) are 'ex-
pressly' made applicable 'in determining the ownership of stock' under § 302,
and consequently it is reasonable to apply them whenever ownership of
stock is relevant, whether by statutory direction or otherwise." Bittker, supra
note 65, at 324 n.67.
77. S. REP. No. 1622, 82d Cong., 2 Sess. 44-45 (1954).
78. Id. at 233. ,
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test is not to become as objective as the other tests of section 302
(b), but is to approximate the "net effect" test under the 1939 Code,
then section 302(c) (1) must not be strictly interpreted. The attri-
bution rules of section 318 should be applied only to those dividend
equivalence cases in which constructive ownership is, in fact, tanta-
mount to actual ownership.
